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NEW JERSEY LAW-"REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY" AS ATOOL FOR 
THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF SPOUSAL SELF-SUPPORT-Is THERE 
LIFE AFTER ARNOLV?-Arnold v. Arnold, 167 N.J. Super. 478, 
401 A.2d 261 (App. Div. 1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The obligation of support owed by marital parties to each 
other after termination of their marriage is a topic of recent inter­
est on both constitutiona}1 and practical levels. 2 The recent New 
Jersey case of Arnold v. Arnold3 illustrates the problem courts 
have in making alimony awards consistent with changing attitudes 
about the nature of such awards. 
Dale and Helen Arnold were divorced in New Jersey in 1979. 
Mrs. Arnold, who had been employed both before and during the 
marriage, ended her employment when the couple's children were 
born. Upon divorce, the New Jersey trial court awarded alimony of 
forty dollars a week to Mrs. Arnold, limiting the award to a period 
of thirty months. The trial judge termed this award "rehabilitative 
alimony."4 Under the concept of rehabilitative alimony a court de­
termines the amount of time necessary to allow a supported spouse 
to recover from the economic effects of a marriage and accordingly 
limits the duration of the alimony award to that period. The pur­
pose of this time limitation is to encourage the supported spouse to 
become self-supporting within the specific period. 5 
Mrs. Arnold objected to the time limitation placed upon her 
award of alimony and appealed the judgment. The New Jersey Su­
1. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); The United States Supreme Court has 
recently held that an Alabama statute that placed marital support obligations upon 
husbands but not wives was in contravention of the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection. The Court opined that when inquiries into the actual needs of the parties 
are made at trial, as a matter of course, there is no justification to use sex as a proxy 
for need. Id. 
2. See, e.g., Inker, Walsh & Perocchio, Alimony Orders Following Short Term 
Marriages, 12 FAM. L.Q. 91 (1978)·(articulating problems created by the recent in­
crease in divorce after short-term marriages); Miller, Where Are We Now on Spousal 
Support?, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 302 (1978) (discussion of California's recent reevaluation 
of support problems and its method of dealing with them); Oldham, The Effect of 
Unmarried Cohabitation by a Former Spouse upon His or Her Right to Continue to 
Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAM. L. 249 (1979) (general assessment of support problems 
arising out of "the increasing popularity of informal living arrangements"). 
3. 167 N.J. Super. 478, 401 A.2d 261 (App. Div. 1979). 
4. Id. at 481, 401 A.2d at 263. 
5. See notes 46-57 infra and accompanying text. 
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perior Court, Appellate Division, held that rehabilitative alimony 
was not an appropriate method through which to encourage spousal 
self-support and modified the alimony order to eliminate the termi­
nation date. 6 The approach used in Arnold stands as an obstacle to 
the effective use of rehabilitative alimony in New Jersey as a tool 
for the allocation of spousal support obligations. The wisdom of the 
decision can be assessed best by a discussion of the changing con­
cepts of alimony awards in New Jersey, the goals of rehabilitative 
alimony, and the alternatives suggested within the Arnold opinion. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALIMONY IN NEW JERSEY 
The right to alimony in New Jersey7 has always been purely 
statutory.8 Its original purpose was to enforce the obligation of sup­
port incumbent upon a husband who had wrongfully left his wife. 9 
Under this concept, a husband had an absolute duty to support his 
wife and was not permitted to absolve himself by his own miscon­
duct. 10 Alimony was, at first, limited to instances where the hus­
band was guilty of adultery or extreme cruelty. In 1820 the New 
Jersey statutory scheme changed to permit awards of alimony in in­
stances where the husband had been guilty of other marital mis­
conduct as well. 11 This change was prompted by the view that sup­
6. 167 N.J. Super. at 481-82, 401 A.2d at 263. 
7. New Jersey's concept of alimony developed from the practice of the English 
ecclesiastical courts. Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 52 A. 694 (1902). For a gen­
eral history of the development of alimony from the English ecclesiastical courts to 
modem statutes, see Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law 
and its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1939). 
8. O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 12 N.J. 222, 229, 96 A.2d 410, 413, cert. denied, 
346 U.S. 824 (1953); Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J. 531,536,64 A.2d 436, 439 (1949). 
9. O'Loughlin v. Q'Loughlin, 12 N.J. 222, 229-30, 96 A.2d 410, 413, cert. 
denied, 346 U.S. 824 (1953); Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 751-52, 52 A. 694, 700 
(1902). 
10. In Isserman v. Isserman, 11 N.J. 106, 115, 93 A.2d 571, 575 (1952), the 
court stated, "Alimony in its technical sense in this State is purely statutory and is an 
expression of the continuing duty which a husband owes his wife, and of which he is 
not permitted to absolve himself by his own misconduct, although that misconduct 
brings about the dissolution of the marriage." Id. See O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 12 
N.J. 222, 229-30, 96 A.2d 410,413, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824 (1953); Lynde v. Lynde, 
64 N.J. Eq. 736, 751-52, 52 A. 694, 700 (1902). 
11. The 1974 statute provided: "[Wlhen a divorce shall be decreed on account 
of the parties being in the prohibited degrees, or for the cause of adultery or ex­
treme cruelty, the chancery shall, and may, ... take such order touching the ... 
alimony of the wife, ... as ... may be fit, equitable and just" (emphasis added). 
Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 752, 52 A. 694, 700 (1902). The statute was re­
vised in 1820 to exclude the italicized portions. Id. at 753, 52 A. at 700. Lynde 
contains a good discussion of the nature of alimony and the early statutory changes 
in New Jersey. 
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port was a "personal benefit"12 bestowed upon a wife solely by 
virtue of a marriage and should continue as necessary, regardless of 
the nature of the husband's misconduct. The courts held that ali­
mony should serve neither as a punishment for the husband13 nor 
as a reward for the wife14 but rather should depend upon the wife's 
need for support tempered by the husband's ability to pay. IS 
The New Jersey statute authorizing alimony awards is broad in 
its terms,16 with specific factors for consideration being left to judi­
cial pronouncement. 17 Over the years, the courts have focused on 
the wife's needs and the husband's ability to pay, and accordingly 
have developed a list of factors to consider. IS These factors take 
into account the current needs and means of the parties. No at­
tempt is or has been made to judicially alter the financial status 
quo of the supported spouse in the fashioning of alimony awards. 19 
In 1971, New Jersey passed the Divorce Reform Act. 20 This act 
transformed the concept of alimony by authorizing a court to order 
a wife to pay alimony to her husband. 21 Thiswas the first recogni­
12. ld. 
13. Turi v. Turi, 34 N.J. Super. 313, 322, 112 A.2d 278, 283 (App. Div. 1955). 
"The right to support should not be used as an instrument to punish a husband who 
is guilty in the matrimonial relation." ld. 
14. Garlinger v. Garlinger, 129 N.J. Super. 37, 39, 322 A.2d 190, 191 (Ch. Div. 
1974). "The distinct objective of alimony is the proper support of the wife, and the 
wife is not entitled to have more from the husband" (emphasis in original). ld.; 
O'Neill v. O'Neill, 18 N.J. Misc. 82, 11 A.2d 128 (Ch. 1939), afI'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 278, 
12 A.2d 839 (1940). 
15. Mcleod v. Mcleod, 131 N.J. Eq. 44, 46, 23 A.2d 545, 547 (1941). 
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute provides 
that the court shall award such alimony as is "fit, reasonable and just." ld. 
17. Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 352, 122 A.2d 352, 357 (1956). 
Martindell held that the legislature vested the courts with wide discretion in 
determining the proper factors to consider in formulating a proper support award 
since the statute failed to include an appropriate list of those factors. 
18. In Greenberg v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. Super. 96, 312 A.2d 878 (App. Div. 
1973), the court listed the following factors: 
(1) the actual needs of the wife; (2) the husband's actual means and his abil­
ity to pay support; (3) the physical conditions of the parties; (4) their social 
position; (5)' the separate property and income of the wife, and (6) any other 
factors which bear upon the question of fair and reasonable support. 
ld. at 100, 312 A.2d at 880. 
19. Although no New Jersey court has articulated a reluctance to use judicial 
means to alter the needs of the parties, there is no evidence in the case law that any 
such attempts had been made prior to the courts being granted the power to allocate 
marital property between the parties. See notes 22-27 infra and accompanying text. 
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:34-1 to :34-27 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). For back­
ground concerning the policies embodied in this act, see generally [1970] NEW JER­
SEY DIVORCE LAw STUDY COMM'N, FlNAL REpORT. 
21. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1980) provides that the court 
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tion in New Jersey that a wife also has some obligation of support 
arising out of a marraige. The concept of alimony has changed radi­
cally by the legislative recognition of the wife's support obligation. 
No longer can alimony be characterized as a husband's "duty" or a 
wife's "personal benefit." The duty is incumbent upon both parties. 
This change can be viewed as a legislative directive to consider the 
wife's support obligation in determining a proper method and 
amount of support. 
The Divorce Reform Act also permitted a court, for the first 
time, to divide marital property between the parties upon divorce 
in an equitable fashion, regardless of which party holds title.22 Un­
der the new statutory scheme a court can balance an award of 
property23 with an award of alimony in order to insure that a 
proper fund is available for the support of the supported spouse. 24 
An additional factor to consider in making an alimony award under 
the Divorce Reform Act is the amount of property received 
through an equitable distribution25 of marital property.26 Since the 
amount of property owned by a spouse is a factor that the courts 
consider in assessing the support needs of that spouse,27 greater 
may make orders "as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties...." Compare 
this with the old alimony statute which authorized the court to make orders "as to 
the alimony or maintenance of the wife . ..." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1952) 
(emphasis added). 
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1980) provides: "[W]here a 
judgment of divorce ... is entered the court may make such award ... to effectuate 
an equitable distribution of the property ... acquired by ... [the parties] during the 
marriage." The old statute made no reference to property division. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:34-23 (West 1952). . . 
23. Not all property held by the parties is subject to distribution by the court. 
The statute empowers the court to allocate only property "beneficially acquired" by 
the parties during the marriage. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
For a general guide to what types of property are included, see Painter v. Painter, 65 
N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 
(1974). 
24. The following cases stress the interrelationship between an award of prop­
erty and an award of alimony: Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 359, 371 A.2d 1,6 (1977); 
Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196,218,320 A.2d 484, 496 (1974); Rothman v. Rothman, 
65 N.J. 219, 234, 320 A.2d 496, 504 (1974); Esposito v. Esposito, 158 N.J. Super. 285, 
300, 385 A.2d 1266, 1274 (App. Div. 1978). See Comment, Divorce Law-Equitable 
Distribution of Property in New Jersey, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 447, 455 (1975). 
25. See note 28 infra. 
26. See Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 359, 371 A.2d 1, 6 (1977). In Smith, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of a proper equi­
table distribution of property. The court held that once this determination is made, 
the trial court should review the prior alimony award to determine if it would still be 
equitable. 
27. See note 18 supra. 
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awards of marital property diminish the support needs of the sup­
ported spouse. The courts thus gain the ability to adjust the sup­
port status quo of the parties through an award of property.28 An­
other such judicially employed means of adjusting the support 
status quo which is both workable and desirable is rehabilitative 
alimony. 
III. REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY DEFINED 
Although courts in other jurisdictions29 have examined the 
concept of rehabilitative alimony, and some states have enacted 
statutes30 which embrace its theories, New Jersey courts have 
provided only limited expression on the subject. The first case to 
introduce rehabilitative alimony in New Jersey was Turner v. 
28. In making an award of equitable distribution of property, a court first deter­
mines which property is subject to the court's power. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 
213-14, 320 A.2d 484, 493-94 (1974). The trial judge then considers various criteria 
and detennines the most equitable allocation of that property between the parties. 
Among the factors that can be considered are: The respective earning abilities of the 
parties, the source of the property, the current value and income producing capacity 
of the property, the present mental and physical health of the parties, the probability 
of continuing present employment at present earnings or better earnings in the fu­
ture, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage, and the economic cir­
cumstances of each spouse at the time of the property distribution. Id. at 211, 320 
A.2d at 492. Thus the court takes into consideration a number of support-related con­
siderations when detennining an equitable property distribution. 
29. E.g., Zildjian v. Zildjian, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1337, in which the 
court expressed a reluctance to embrace rehabilitative alimony but showed a 
willingness to accept its use if proper guidelines could be established. Id. at­
1353-54. A New York trial court justified its use by finding that the wife had a duty 
to mitigate the economic damages caused by the marriage and that the husband 
should subsidize her efforts to mitigate. Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 
N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. 1975). South Dakota and Virginia have expressed misgivings 
about its use and effect. Guindon v. Guindon, 256 N.W.2d 894 (S. D. 1977); Thomas 
v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 229 S.E.2d 887 (1976). 
30. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4801 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) directs courts to consider, 
when making an award of alimony, "[t]he time required for the supported spouse to 
acquire appropriate education, training and employment." The Florida support stat­
ute directs the court to consider "the time necessary for either party to acquire suffi­
cient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate employment." 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). Other state statutes use essentially 
the same language. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114(2)(b) (Bradford-Robinson Cum. 
Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 504(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); Ky. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.200(2)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1980); MONT. REv. 
CODES ANN. § 40-4-203(2)(b). Arizona also lists as an additional criteria "whether 
such education or training is readily available." ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
25-319(B)(2). For a critique of the California statute see Note, Rehabilitative Spousal 
Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution 
Trauma, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 493 (1977). 
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Turner. 31 In Turner the parties were divorced after twenty-two 
years of marriage. At that time the children of the marriage were 
close to the age of emancipation. The wife, who was forty-five 
years of age, was employed part-time and was six months away 
from receiving a degree as a reading specialist. The court found 
that once this degree was obtained Mrs. Turner would be capable 
of earning twelve thousand dollars per year. Mrs. Turner received 
approximately eighty thousand dollars by way of equitable distribu­
tion of the marital property. Taking into consideration the wife's 
future earning potential, the trial court awarded her fifty dollars a 
week alimony and limited the duration of that award to eighteen 
months, at which time the award would automatically terminate. 
The court determined that the eighteen-month period would allow 
the wife one full year of employment as a reading specialist and 
that this time would be necessary to enable her to be in a position 
to adequately maintain hersel£32 The trial judge characterized the 
award as rehabilitative alimony. 
Turner defined rehabilitative alimony as "alimony payable for 
a short, but specific and terminable period of time, which will 
cease when the recipient is, in the exercise of reasonable efforts, in 
a position of self-support. "33 Under this plan, a court may make 
findings of reasonable capacity and expectations of future em­
ployability in making a present determination of when it would be 
proper for support to terminate. 34 
The primary goals of rehabilitative alimony, as expressed in 
Turner, are to reduce post divorce recourse to the courts,35 to pro­
vide the supporting spouse with some degree of certainty as to 
the nature and extent of the support obligation owed to a form­
er spouse,36 and to encourage a supported spouse to develop 
31. 158 N.J. Super. 313, 385 A.2d 1280 (Ch. Div. 1978). 
32. Id. at 324-25, 385 A.2d at 1286. 
33. ld. at 314,385 A.2d at 1280. 
34. ld. at 315, 385 A.2d at 1280-81. The following example illustrates this point. 
Suppose a supported spouse was a secretary but gave up that employment when the 
parties married. After four years the parties are divorced. If a judge finds that it will 
take six months of training to relearn the stale secretarial skills and that it is reason­
able to expect that it will take an additional six months to find stable employment, 
then the court might order that alimony should cease at the end of twelve months. 
The amount of such alimony would be sufficient to allow the supported spouse the 
opportunity to reacquire the secretarial skills. In essence, the court would find that, 
with reasonable efforts and a proper amount of support, the supported spouse will be 
in a position of self-support in twelve months. 
35. ld. at 315, 385 A.2d at 1281. 
36. ld. at 315, 385 A.2d at 1280. 
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employment skills within a precise period of time so as to become 
self-supporting. 37 
A. Limiting Post Divorce Recourse to the Couris 
Post divorce recourse to the courts is increasing. The large 
amount of litigation in matrimonial matters is severely burdening 
the New Jersey court system. 38 Parties often seek post divorce al­
terations of support orders based upon a change in the circum­
stances of the parties. 39 If a court could anticipate such changes in 
circumstances and could mold its judgment to reflect these anti­
cipated changes, then the judgment would be less likely to require 
later modification. Consequently, there would be less recourse to 
the courts. The use of rehabilitative alimony would allow a court to 
consider reasonably expected future events concerning the ability 
of a spouse to become self-supporting within a specific time period. 
Taking these future events into consideration, the court could 
make a present determination as to when alimony should cease. By 
building in an automatic termination date for the alimony award, 
the parties would need to resort to the courts less frequently for 
termination of the award when the anticipated changes occur. 40 If 
the anticipated changes do not occur, then recourse to the courts 
would be necessary. Since, however, the judgment is based upon 
events likely to occur, such recourse to the courts would be less 
probable than if rehabilitative alimony were not used. 
B. Providing Certainty to the Supporting Spouse 
A major purpose of the Divorce Reform Act is to facilitate the 
termination of dead marriages. 41 Since the declared public policy is 
37. Id. at 314-15, 385 A.2d at 1280. 
38. Interim Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litiga­
tion, 104 N.].L.]. 107 (1979). This report recommends sweeping changes in the rules 
governing matrimonial proceedings in New Jersey, in part in response to the ever 
increasing number of divorce oases. Id. See also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139,416 A.2d 
45 (1980). "The frequency with which courts are called upon to make or modify sup­
port awards needs no documentation." Id. at 149, 416 A.2d at 51. 
39. The following cases are representative of the various grounds upon which 
such relief is sought. Fern v. Fern, 140 N.J. Super. 121, 355 A.2d 672 (App. Div. 
1976) (reduction in husband's earnings); Grossman v. Grossman, 128 N.J. Super. 193, 
319 A.2d 508 (Ch. Div. 1974) (paramour living in same abode with wife); Hallberg v. 
Hallberg, 113 N.J. Super. 205, 273 A.2d 389 (App. Div. 1971) (increase in wife's 
earnings); Gulick v. Gulick, 113 N.J. Super. 366,273 A.2d 792 (Ch. Div. 1971) (infla­
tionary increase in living costs). 
40. Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 315, 385 A.2d 1280, 1281 (Ch. Div. 
1978). 
41. The Divorce Law Study Commission was appointed by the New Jersey 
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to end such marriages, it follows that the ties between parties, cre­
ated solely by the marriage, should be severed whenever possi­
ble. 42 'The obligation of support is such a tie and should be severed 
when the circumstances so allow. With the incidence of divorce 
after short-term marriages on the rise,43 divorced spouses are re­
marrying more frequently than ever. It is natural that a divorced 
spouse would like to know the extent of ties to an old obligation. 
Such knowledge would allow a supporting spouse to plan the future 
in a constructive manner. Whenever equitably possible, supporting 
spouses should be enabled to make new lives for themselves with­
out unnecessary economic constraints. 44 Therefore, alimony awards 
that can be avoided should be. By encouraging the supported 
spouse to become self-supporting, and by determining in advance 
when this will occur, rehabilitative alimony allows the supporting 
spouse to know with greater certainty the extent of future support 
obligations. 45 
C. Encouraging Spousal Self-SUpport 
Since its enactment, the Divorce Reform Act has imposed re­
ciprocal obligations of support on both husbands and wives. 46 Be-
legislature "to study and review the statutes and court decisions relating to di­
vorce...." [1970] NEW JERSEY DIVORCE LAW STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 
at i. The committee made recommended changes in New Jersey's divorce laws 
which were subsequently enacted in near entirety. The committee report states 
that "[t]he objective to strive for is to make it legally possible to terminate dead 
marriages." [d. at 6. The report characterized this as the "central policy." [d. at 7. 
Courts consistently refer to this as the major policy behind the change in divorce 
laws. Gazillo v. Gazillo, 153 N.J. Super. 159, 171, 379 A.2d 288, 294 (Ch. Div. 1977); 
Schneider v. Schneider, 142 N.J. Super. 512, 515, 362 A.2d 61, 62 (Ch. Div. 1976); 
Altbrandt v. Altbrandt, 129 N.J. Super. 235,237,322 A.2d 839, 840 (Ch. Div. 1974). 
42. In Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 443, 393 A.2d 583, 586 
(App. Div. 1978), the appellate division modified a judgment of equitable distribu­
tion which had awarded the wife part interest in the husband's business. The court 
opined that property should be allocated in such a way as to allow the parties to be 
independent, and not in a way that forces their continued partnership. 
43. Inker, Walsh, & Perocchi, supra note 2, at 92. 
44. "The law should provide both parties with the opportunity to make a new 
life on this earth. Neither should be shackled by the unnecessary burdens of an un­
happy marriage." Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 317, 385 A.2d 1280, 1282 
(Ch. Div. 1978). 
45. [d. at 315, 385 A.2d at 1281. 
46. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1980) (allowing support to 
either party as the circumstances require). See note 21 supra. Also, because the obli­
gation is reciprocal, the terms "husband" and "wife" are inappropriate. The proper 
terms to use in an inquiry into support matters are "supporting" and "supported 
spouse." How that designation is made is a function of the arrangements of a particu­
lar marriage. 
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fore this enactment the obligation rested solely upon the hus­
band. 47 At that time, New Jersey courts did not allow a husband to 
lessen his support obligation merely because his actual income was 
low. The courts required a husband to fulfill his capacity for earn­
ing. 48 Awards of alimony were not based upon a husband's actual 
earnings, but rather upon what a court determined was his realistic 
earning capacity. Courts reasoned that a husband should not be al­
lowed to avoid his support obligations by laziness49 or by inatten­
tion to business affairs. 50 By making an award of alimony based 
upon potential earnings, the court was forcing the· husband to 
achieve his earning capacity. Since the wife's support obligation is 
now coextensive with that of her husband's, there is no reason why 
the wife's realistic earning capacity should not be considered in 
determining a proper support award. 51 
Rehabilitative alimony recognizes that a marriage often imparts 
an economic disadvantage upon the supported spouse. 52 This 
spouse must often forego career development in order to fulfill 
other marital functions. As a result, the circumstances of a mar­
riage can impair the earning capacity of the supported spouse. 53 
Under rehabilitative alimony, a court recognizes as a "need" the 
amount of money necessary to enable a supported spouse to de­
velop new employment skills or to enhance old ones. 54 The re­
sulting alimony awards encompass what is monetarily necessary for 
the development of these skills. A supported spouse is then able to 
attain the desired earning capacity without the added pressures 
that result from being unable to afford the time or money neces­
sary to gain employment skills. 55 
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1952). See note 21 supra. 
48. Robins v. Robins, 106 N.J. Eq. 198, 150 A. 340 (1930). 
49. Mowery v. Mowery, 38 N.J. Super. 92, 102-03, U8 A.2d 49, 55 (App. Div. 
1955). Mowery contains a survey of cases in which courts have ignored a husband's 
actual earnings and have made awards based upon the court's determination of what 
he could be making. 
50. Hess v. Hess, 134 N.]. Eq. 360, 362, 35 A.2d 677, 678 (1943). In Hess, the 
husband claimed that he was able to make a net profit of only 12% of his gross busi­
ness receipts. The court held that any reasonable businessman could do better and, 
therefore, based a support award on an amount the court felt was more reasonable. 
51. In Turi v. Turi, 34 N.J. Super. 313, 112 A.2d 278 (App. Div. 1955), the 
court, in dicta, stated that a wife should be encouraged to seek employment. Id. at 
323, 112 A.2d at 284. The court apparently paid only lip service to the notion be­
cause no New Jersey court has since required this. 
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Encouragement to actually develop these skills comes through 
a predetermination of a realistic time within which the projected 
earning capacity should be realized. 56 The alimony award automat­
ically terminates at the end of this period. This automatic termina­
tion of support provides an inducement57 to reach the determined 
earning capacity within the established period. As a result, both 
spouses contribute to the reciprocal obligation of support according 
to earning capacity in a way that allows full development of such 
capacity. 
IV. LIMITATIONS ON REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY 
Turner recognizes that rehabilitative alimony is not a proper 
disposition in all cases. The opinion suggests that this type of 
award is not workable when, for example, the supported spouse is 
elderly and has little job experience. 58 The issue of whether 
rehabilitative alimony should be employed is a determination to be 
made by the trial court. Turner also envisions a partial use of 
rehabilitative alimony in conjunction with a traditional award of ali­
mony which has no automatic termination date. 59 A supported 
spouse may never be able to achieve an earning capacity that will 
enable him or her to live in the manner which the equities de­
mand. In this situation, a court may order a permanent award of ali­
mony as a supplement to the amount that the supported spouse 
can earn through a realization of full economic potential. This al­
lows a court to encourage a supported spouse to obtain employ­
ment skills, yet to recognize that there is no realistic possibility 
that the supported spouse will achieve self-support at a level which 
the equities demand. 
Although rehabilitative alimony is not appropriate in all situa­
56. ld. at 317, 385 A.2d at 1282. 
57. Turner recognizes that any method designed to encourage a person to be­
come employed must have "teeth" in it. ld. If this were not the case, the court 
would lose the ability to know with relative certainty that such employment will oc­
cur. It is the "teeth" of automatic termination that induces the supported spouse to 
seek self-support. 
58. The court maintains, however, that "such women are the exception and not 
the rule." ld. In Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 275 A.2d 132 (1971), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court refused to require a wife to work to support herself when the hus­
band had sufficient income to support her, and the wife had developed no employ­
ment skills during the 26-year marriage. The court left unanswered the question 
whether the result would have been different had there been a short-term marriage 
involved and a younger supported spouse. 
59. Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. at 318-19,385 A.2d at 1282. 
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tions, it does provide a useful tool for achieving the goals outlined 
above. It provides the court with the means to encourage spousal 
self-support. Once a spouse does become self-supporting, the dead 
marriage can be put to rest further, and both parties can plan a fu­
ture with minimal regard to the past. Furthermore, if the support 
obligations of the parties can be established effectively during the 
divorce trial, then future recourse to the courts will be minimized. 
V. REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY ATTACKED 
In Arnold v. Arnold,60 the only published appellate court de­
cision in New Jersey to discuss the use of rehabilitative alimony, 
the court dealt a heavy blow to this concept by specifically 
disapproving the use of rehabilitative alimony as outlined in 
Turner. The appellate division disapproved the use of rehabilitative 
alimony as a means of encouraging spousal self-support except in 
the most extraordinary circumstances. 61 The court never defined 
what circumstances would make rehabilitative alimony a permissi­
ble tool but merely stated that no extraordinary circumstances 
could be found in the trial record. As a result, the order was 
modified to exclude the termination date. 62 Since the court did not 
define the extraordinary circumstances in which it would allow an 
award of alimony, it is difficult to determine whether the concept 
has died a practical death or remains viable in a limited form. 63 
Arnold is not significant because of the specific result it 
achieved; the opinion does not relate enough relevant facts. It is 
significant, however, because of the reasons it offers for disap­
60. 167 N.J. Super. 478, 401 A.2d 261 (App. Div. 1979). See text accompanying 
notes 3-6 supra for the facts and holding ofArnold. 
61. ld. at 481,401 A.2d at 262. 
62. ld. at 481,401 A.2d at 263. 
63. There is some support for the proposition that the "extraordinary circum­
stances" exception of Arnold is nothing more than a code for the complete disap­
proval of rehabilitative alimony. In the recent unreported appellate case of Osmun v. 
McGowan. No. A-1979-78 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. Aug. 17, 1980), cert. granted, 
106 N.J.L.J. 364 (1980), the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division refused 
to analyze the factual merits of a trial judge's award of rehabilitative alimony. In­
stead, the appellate court cited Arnold as creating a blanket prohibition of the use of 
rehabilitative alimony and it reversed the termination date of the award. ld. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, has recently lent support to the via­
bility of rehabilitative alimony. In dicta, nestled in a footnote, New Jersey's high 
court expressed the opinion that it did not share Arnold's view that unusual circum­
stances are needed to employ rehabilitative alimony. Unfortunately, no clearer 
guidelines for its use were offered. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 155 n.9, 416 A.2d 45, 
53 n.9 (1980). 
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proving rehabilitative alimony and for its suggestions of alternatives. 
Arnold at no point takes issue with the goals of rehabilitative ali­
mony. Rather, the court merely states that an automatic termina­
tion provision, which is the tool used to implement rehabilitative 
alimony, is not a proper method for achieving those goals. 64 Arnold 
suggests that two alternatives, molding the quantum65 of alimony 
and adjusting the equitable distribution of property,66 are better 
suited to meeting those goals. Unfortunately, the Arnold court's 
objection to automatic termination provisions is not well-founded, 
and its suggested alternatives are not workable. 
A. Automatic Termination 
Arnold argues that automatic termination of alimony is gener­
ally unwarranted since the awards are always modifiable in the fu­
ture based upon a change of circumstances of the parties.67 If a 
supported spouse does indeed become self-supporting, then the 
award can always be terminated through modification by the court. 
Arnold relies on the prior New Jersey decision of Stout v. Stout68 
to support the proposition that a court should not automatically re­
duce alimony based upon the possible happening of a future event 
as the award is always modifiable if the event actually occurS. 69 In 
Stout the trial court ordered that alimony would cease upon the 
sale of the matrimonial abode. The sale was to take place two years 
after the judgment of· divorce. The appellate court reversed, 
arguing that the cessation date was arbitrary because it was not 
linked to any finding that the sale of the matrimonial abode would 
in any way affect the support status of the parties. 7o Contrary to 
the interpretation of the court in Arnold, Stout more correctly 
stands for the proposition that automatic reduction of alimony 
should not be based upon the happening of a future event unless 
there is a finding that the future event will substantially affect the 
needs of the supported spouse. Since a court in awarding re­
habilitative alimony must make such prior findings,71 rehabili­
tative alimony does not violate the rationale of Stout. 
64. Id. at 480, 401 A.2d at 262. 
65. Id. at 480, 401 A.2d at 263. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 480,401 A.2d at 262. 
68. 155 N.J. Super. 196, 382 A.2d 659 (App. Div. 1977). In Stout, the parties 
were divorced after an IS-year marriage. They had four children aged 9 through 16 at 
the time of the divorce. 
69. 167 N.J. Super. at 480,401 A.2d at 262. 
70. Stout v. Stout, 155 N.J. Super. at 205,382 A.2d at 663. 
71. Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. at 315,385 A.2d at 1280-81. 
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The court in Arnold argues that determination of a supported 
spouse's ability to become self-supporting, as well as the date that 
this will occur, requires too much speculation and, therefore, 
should not be relied on when fashioning an alimony award. Accord­
ingly, the opinion suggests that these determinations are not a 
proper basis upon which to make a definite order addreSSing the 
parties' support needs. It is, however, precisely because of the 
New Jersey view that alimony judgments are always modifiable72 
that courts should be allowed to broaden the area of permissible 
inference to include what otherwise might seem to be impermissi­
ble speculation. 73 If the award were not modifiable upon automatic 
termination, then justice might require automatic termination to be 
ordered only upon a finding of great certainty that "rehabilitation" 
will occur. 74 Since the award is modifiable, the degree of certainty 
necessary to make the award is lessened. This modification proce­
dure serves to mitigate the severity of the effect of nonoccurrence 
of the future event. 75 
Ordinarily, the party seeking a modification has the burden of 
showing a sufficient change of circumstances to justify the modifica­
tion. 76 A finding for an award of rehabilitative alimony, in effect, 
creates a presumption that the supported spouse can become self­
supporting within the time designated. If circumstances change so 
that this goal is no longer realistic, then the supported spouse may 
rebut the presumption by a showing of this change of circum­
stances. The supported spouse may then seek modification for a 
longer fixed term or for traditional permanent alimony. ,This pre­
72. Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 569, 264 A.2d 49, 52(1970); Martindell 
v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341,352, 122 A.2d 352, 357 (1956); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 137 N.J. 
Eq. 369, 375, 44 A.2d 169, 172 (1945). 
73. The Florida courts, which are specifically authorized by statute to award 
rehabilitative alimony, offer this caveat: "[Clare must be taken to avoid confusing 
the general with the specific and mistaking the promise of the future for the reality 
ofthe present." Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d 1129, 1131 (Fla. 1976). Nevertheless, Florida 
courts are able to make those detenninations. 
74. In Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 137, 254 N.W.2d 198 (1977), the court held 
that an award of alimony for a specific period of time may not be modified under the 
Wisconsin statutory scheme. The court, therefore, said that the limitation should be 
geared to a certain event that will eliminate the present impediment to work. It 
called such a limited award a "two-edged sword." ld. at 146, 254 N.W. 2d 203. It 
gives both parties certainty, but it does not allow modification. 
75. In Morrison v. Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 573 P.2d 41, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139 
(1978), the California court held that "rehabilitative alimony" should only be used if 
the court retains jurisdiction to modify the award. It is only in this way that the court 
can oversee the possible injustices that might result from the award. 
76. Schiff v. Schiff, 116 N.J. Super. 546, 563, 283 A.2d 131, 140 (App. Div. 
1971). 
140 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:127 
sumption operates to encourage the supported spouse to gain the 
employment skills necessary to become self-supporting since he or 
she might be unable to sustain the burden of rebutting the pre­
sumption. Mere passage of time, without an attempt to become 
self-supporting, would not qualifY as a sufficient change of circum­
stances to rebut the presumption. On the other hand, if the cir­
cumstances actually do show that the self-support goal cannot be 
met for reasons outside the control of the supported spouse,77 then 
the modifiable nature of the award would temper the injustices 
that Arnold envisions. As this clearly demonstrates, New Jersey's 
system of modification is such that rehabilitative alimony can effec­
tively encourage spousal self-support without the harsh effects that 
Arnold fears. 
B. Molding the Quantum of Alimony 
In rejecting the automatic termination feature of rehabilitative 
alimony, an alternative method of encouraging spousal self-support 
suggested by Arnold is molding the quantum of alimony.78 Al­
though the court fails to explain what this means, it is clear that 
merely molding the amount of support is not an effective substitute 
for the role automatic termination serves in encouraging spousal 
self-support. If the court is suggesting that alimony be awarded in 
amounts sufficient to satisfY a spouse's needs in his or her effort to 
gain employment skills, then the court's method is deficient be­
cause there is no incentive79 to actually gain these skills. Since the 
higher award continues indefinitely until such skills are, in fact, ac­
quired, the supported spouse could elect not to attain the skills, 
and no penalty would encourage their pursuit. This encouraging 
factor is the precise purpose that automatic termination serves. 
If Arnold is suggesting that a court award a supported spouse 
less than is actually needed for the spouse's support so that there is 
incentive to seek employment,80 the draconian implications of such 
77. Such reasons might include illness, unexpected obsolescence of skills, 
unavailability of employment due to market conditions, change in the care needs of 
children in custody, and any other unexpected change in physical, emotional or eco­
nomic conditions. 
78. 167 N.J. Super. at 481, 401 A.2d at 263. 
79. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. Turner suggests that some 
"teeth" are necessary. 
80. It is likely that this is precisely what Arnold is suggesting since it approv­
ingly termed the award of alimony in that case "hardly a munificent amount de­
signed to encourage indolence on the part of the recipient." Arnold v. Arnold, 167 
N.J. Super. at 481,401 A.2d at 263. 
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a system should lead to its rejection. This is especially apparent 
when comparison is made with the impact of rehabilitative ali­
mony. Through rehabilitative alimony the supported spouse would 
receive an amount of alimony that would allow him or her to de­
velop employment skills in an economic atmosphere in which he or 
she need not be burdened with meeting daily living costS. 81 The 
encouragement comes in the knowledge that by a certain date sup­
port will be terminated or reduced82 so that a maximization of em­
ployment skills is in the supported spouse's best interest. Under 
the Arnold plan, the supported spouse would not have the oppor­
tunity to maximize employment skills. His or her first concern in­
evitably would be to provide funds to meet current living needs. 
This would place the supported spouse in the inequitable position 
of entering the job market at a competitive disadvantage. He or 
she would necessarily have to find a job without first having had 
the opportunity to increase his or her qualifications through skills 
development. 
This kind of "encouragement" to seek employment seems con­
trary to one of the major underpinnings of rehabilitative alimony, 
which is a sensitivity toward neutralizing the detrimental economic 
impact that a marriage has on a supported spouse. 83 Under the 
Arnold approach, the supported spouse, who has foregone career 
development in favor of providing other marital functions, would 
be forced to seek employment without· the opportunity to recover 
from this sacrifice to the marriage. It is clear that molding the 
quantum of alimony, regardless of the method the court in Arnold 
envisions, will not serve the goals of rehabilitative alimony as pro­
ductively as would automatic termination. Providing higher awards 
alone will not serve as an encouragement to gain employment skills 
and employment. On the other hand, providing lower awards will 
impose too harsh a burden. Arnold's suggested alternative is, un­
fortunately, not as viable as the method it disapproves. 
C. Adjusting Property Distribution 
Finally, Arnold suggests that a court adjust the distribu­
tion of property84 upon divorce in order to give the supported 
spouse assets from which to draw for support. If this is done, the 
81. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. 
82. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. 
83. Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. at 318, 385 A.2d at 1282. 
84. 167 N.J. Super. at 480, 401 A.2d at 263. See also note 22 supra. 
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extent of the supporting spouse's obligation will be lessened and 
made more certain. Property distribution addresses the goal of 
minimizing the support obligation so a supporting spouse can plan 
the future with fewer ties to obligations arising out of the dead mar­
riage. While this approach does eliminate some of the ties to the 
dead marriage, it generally does not lead to a total extinction of 
the support obligation. 85 Today's society is geared toward the 
overencumbering of assets,86 a situation which minimizes true eq­
uities in assets which could be used for support purposes. Addi­
tionally, in marriages of short duration there is often little marital 
property accumulated so there is often little to divide. As a result, 
the full intent of the goal usually is not met. This procedure rarely 
will be an effective substitute for rehabilitative alimony. Property 
distribution is a method that courts can use, to the extent that 
property is available, to effectuate an allocation of support obliga­
tion in conjunction with rehabilitative alimony; but Arnold's at­
tempt to attack rehabilitative alimony by pointing to property dis­
tribution is unjustified. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rehabilitative alimony, although struck with a heavy blow by 
Arnold's disapproval of its use, hopefully is not yet dead in New 
Jersey. Instead, it continues to search for more concrete guidelines 
and definition. Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court Commit­
tee on Matrimonial Litigation proposed a rule change which makes 
reference to rehabilitative alimony.87 Unfortunately, the committee 
85. See Scalingi v. Scalingi, 65 N.J. 180, 320 A.2d 475 (1974), in which the 
court awarded some alimony even when a substantial amount of property was dis­
tributed to the wife. 
86. Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborn­
ing?, 27 MAINE L. REV. 1,2 (1975). 
87. The committee recommended a change of N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:79-11. The rule 
is entitled "Trial; Claims for Equitable Distribution of Property (Including Reha­
bilitative Alimony) and Child Support." The rule provides that when a matrimonial 
matter is listed for trial the parties must file a "Notice of Application for Alimony." 
The rule further provides that this notice must contain: 
(4) a statement of the work and employment history of the party applying for 
such an award, including a list of all positions of jobs held, the education of 
the party applying for an alimony ... award, all skills of such party relevant 
to employability, the condition of his or her health and all other factors hav­
ing relevancy to the issue of the length and duration of the alimony award to 
be made and whether the concept of rehabilitative alimony should be ap­
plied in making an alimony award. 
Interim Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litigation, 104 
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did not define the tenn, so it is unclear whether it is intended to 
embrace the concept as articulated in Turner, the limited concept 
suggested in Arnold, or some other concept not yet defined. 
Because Arnold is the only reported New Jersey appellate case 
to confront the issue of rehabilitative alimony, it may have a chill­
ing effect upon the use of this technique by the trial courts. Rather 
than so quickly dismissing rehabilitative alimony, Arnold should 
have taken the opportunity to define further the concept and to 
suggest specific guidelines for its use. Arnold's suggested alter­
native methods of achieving the same goals will prove, in practice, 
less effective than the method employed by rehabilitative alimony. 
William M. Rubenstein 
N.J.L.J. 107, 109 (1979) (emphasis added). The report does not give a definition of 
the term rehabilitative alimony nor does it discuss the goals to be achieved by its 
use. Thus, while it does give recognition to some concept of rehabilitative alimony, 
the report is not helpful in discerning how that concept should work. 
